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should consider creating a hybrid between the copyright and patent
statutes in order to solve some of the above mentioned problems. 9 A
speedy registration process coupled with a shorter period of monopoly
would encourage public disclosure of programs without tying up new
developments in the industry. If infringement protection could be granted
to the holder of this quasi-patent while still leaving some leeway for
independent creation by another, production costs for small one-of-a-kind
projects could be held to a minimum because prior art searches to avoid
infringement liability would not have to be made. This is a touchy area.
Too much leeway for independent creation could preclude any degree of
protection against infringement, while not enough could raise costs by
requiring a prior art search before any attempt to create a program for
any purpose.
Whatever Congress' final solution is, it should act quickly. The com-
puter industry affects almost every kind of industry and business in this
country.7° A system of protection for software that would cut costs and
increase productivity in that industry would therefore tend to have the
same effect on costs and productivity in general. Given the present state
of the economy, such a result would seem to be desirable.
ERIC COHEN
CONFLICT CERTIORARI JURISDICTION AND CONTRACTS
AS TOLD BY THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
The vendor, Kendel, brought an action against the broker, Pontious,
and the purchaser, Fernandez, for specific performance of an alleged
contract for the sale of land. The alleged contract, "a deposit receipt,"
which contained a provision that the contract would be binding when
signed by both parties or their agent, was prepared and signed by the
69. Perhaps a compulsory licensing system, similar to that used for phonograph
records, could be established using a licensing organization similar to A.S.C.A.P.
See 17 U.S.C. § k(e) 1964); U.S. COPYRIGHT O FICE, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW:
1965 REVISION BILL (Comm. Print 1965).
Another possibility is a broader type of copyright protection such as the
German system which protects all intellectual creations containing an element of
individuality, even if they are intangible or imperceptible to humans. See Ulmer,
Der Urheberschutz wissenschajtlicher Werke unter besonderer Berucksichtigung
der Programme electronischer Rechenanlagen, 1967 BAYERISCuE AKADEMm DER
WISSENSCHAFTEN, SITZUNGSBERICHTE 1. But see Note, supra note 149, at 1551.
A third alternative would be to establish "petty patent" protection for software,
similar to the German "Gebrauchsmuster," requiring a lesser showing of novelty
than the present patent law standard and extending rights for a shorter period of
time. See Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 32-33 (1962).
Id. at 392 n.170.
70. See generally 54 CORNELL, note 7 supra; 68 COLUMBIA, note 7 supra; and 81
HARVARD, note 1 supra.
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defendant-purchaser. It was then mailed to the plaintiff-vendor's attorney1
who approved and then forwarded it to Kendel. Kendel signed and re-
turned it to the attorney's office. However, before it was forwarded to
the purchaser, the purchaser dispatched a telegram of revocation followed
by a letter of revocation bearing the same date as the telegram. Several
days later the vendor's attorney notified the purchaser by letter that
"the revocation of January 17 had been ineffective because the Deposit
Receipt agreement.., had been executed2 by KENDELS [sic] on Janu-
ary 16 .... ,a The trial court, in an apparent rejection of this argument,
held that "'[a]cceptance must be communicated to the offeror,' ,4 and
the offer may be revoked if notice of the revocation is received by the
offeree prior to acceptance. On direct appeal, this decision was adopted
by the Court of Appeal, Third District.5 On petition for certiorari based
on an alleged "direct conflict" between the the district court's decision
and Strong & Trowbridge Co. v. H. Baals & Co., a prior decision of the
Supreme Court of Florida,7 the supreme court held, writ discharged: No
jurisdictional direct conflict existed since the supreme court in Strong
"was not concerned with the question of whether the actual acceptance
must be communicated to the offeror prior to an effective revocation."
Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1972).
The supreme court's refusal to exercise conflict jurisdiction, under
1. The deposit receipt mailed to the vendor's attorney was accompanied by a note
stating that, "'Mr. Kendell [sic] (the seller) has verbally accepted but desired you to check
the contract over before signing.'" Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So.2d 167, 170 (Fla. 1972)
(dissenting opinion).
2. The pertinent provision of the deposit receipt specified that: "'[Tlhis contract shall
be binding on both parties . . . when this contract shall have been signed by both
parties . . . .'" Id. at 168.
3. Brief for Respondent at 5, Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1972).
4. Kendel v. Pontious, 244 So.2d 543, 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The text of the hold-
ing follows:
Since the offer to purchase was transmitted to the seller by mail, if the offer or
contract does not otherwise provide, it will be implied that acceptance would be
by mail. In Morrison v. Thoelke [Fla. App.], 155 So.2d 889, the Florida courts
adopted the 'deposited acceptance rule' under which acceptance becomes effective
as of date of deposit in the mail. Acceptance must be communicated to the offerer.
Where an offer has not been accepted by the offeree, the offeror may revoke the
offer provided the communication of such revocation is received prior to acceptance.
33 Fla. Jur. 365, Tucker v. Gray [82 Fla. 351], 90 So. 158, Montane vs. Bush
[Fla. App.], 167 So.2d 884.
5. Id. at 543.
6. The Constitution of Florida authorizes discretionary review of appellate court deci-
sions by the following language:
The supreme court may review by certiorari any decision of a district court of
appeal . .. that is in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of
appeal or of the supreme court on the same point of law ....
FLA. CONST. art. V,. § 4(2).
7. Strong & Trowbridge Co. v. H. Baars & Co., 60 Fla. 253, 54 So. 92 (1910) [here-
inafter cited as Strong]. The asserted conflict was with the following rule of law appearing
in Strong:
The acceptance of an offer, to result in a contract, must be: (1) Absolute and
unconditional; (2) identical with the terms of the offer; and (3) in the mode, at
the place, and within the time expressly or impliediy required by the offer.
Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So.2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1972), citing Strong.
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the facts presented, is puzzling, if not disappointing. The oft-stated pur-
pose of discretionary review of district court of appeal decisions is to
provide uniformity in the law.' However, this purpose has evidently been
overlooked by the supreme court in the disposition of this case.
The supreme court has on various occasions stated the principal
situations in which "direct conflict" arises. These situations occur when
(1) a district court of appeal announces a rule of law which conflicts
with a rule9 previously enunciated by the supreme court'0 or (2) a dis-
trict court of appeal applies a rule of law in a case involving substantially
the same controlling facts as a prior supreme court case, but obtains a
different result"" or (3) a district court misapplies the cases cited for
affirmance of the trial court's decision 2 or (4) a district court decision
has made the law "'unclear, if not in conflict.' "13 Even a cursory exami-
nation reveals that the third district court's decision falls within three of
the four conflict situations mentioned.
The first and fourth conflict situations appear from a comparison of
the rule pronounced in Strong4 with the rule in Kendel. The unavoidable
implication of the principle enunciated in Strong is that a contract results
from an acceptance in accordance with the express or implied terms of
the offer. Since the terms of the offer may expressly or impliedly obviate
the general necessity 5 of communication of acceptance, communication
under these circumstances would not be a prerequisite to the formation
of a contract.' 6 When one compares the third district court's rule, that
acceptance of an offer must be communicated, with the above rule, one
finds the law "unclear, if not in conflict."
A conflict situation of the third type is evident after reading the
cases cited by the district court in affirmance of the trial court's decision,
since those cases' do not control the instant case. Morrison v. Theolke,8
8. See, e.g., N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Doman, 117 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1960); Board of
Comm'rs of State Institutions, 116 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1959).
9. The "rule" need only be obiter dictum of a supreme court decision. See Hawkins
v. Williams, 200 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1967); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611
(Fla. 1960).
10. Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960), citing Florida Power
& Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
11. Id.
12. See Allen v. Florida Power Corp., 253 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1971). The supreme court
stated: "It is apparent to us the cases cited by the District Court were misapplied, creat-
ing patent conflict in that they do not directly relate to the instant situation .... " Id. at 403
(emphasis added).
13. Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1964), citing Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund v. LoBean, 127 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1961).
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Corbin, in discussing the rule that there must be communication, concludes that
"such a general requirement is not to be found." I A. CoRnix, CONTsACTS § 67 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Shortridge v. Ghio, 253 S.W.2d 838 (Mo., Kansas City Ct. App. 1952);
International Filter Co. v. Conroe Gin, Ice & Light Co., 277 S.W. 631 (Tex. Com. App.
1925).
17. See note 4 supra.
18. 155 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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which first adopted the "deposited acceptance rule" in Florida, was cited
as controlling; but the rule that acceptance is complete upon depositing
in the mail, is applicable only when no particular mode of acceptance
has been specified.19 The second case cited, Tucker v. Gray,2" was obvi-
ously cited for its quotation from Ryan v. United States.21 The court in
Tucker was concerned with an agency and a statute of frauds question.
In Ryan, the United States Supreme Court dealt with the timelessness of
a written and communicated acceptance. The remaining authority cited
by the lower appellate court, "33 Fla. Jur. 365, ''22 was equally inappli-
cable.as Since none of the cited authorities or cases were concerned with
an offer which specified the manner of acceptance in terms which impliedly
dispensed with the necessity of communication of that acceptance, the
cases were misapplied 24 by the district court. This misapplication created
a conflict situation of the third type.
Nevertheless, the supreme court was unable to find the existence of
a conflict and, consequently, certiorari was denied. A denial of certiorari,
however, is "not to be construed as a decision upon the merits . . . "2
nor can it be used "as precedent or authority for or against the proposi-
tions urged or defended in such proceedings."2 However, the bench and
bar may easily forget this when confronted with the text of Kendel.
Justice Atkins writes:
The trial judge and the District Court of Appeal in the case
sub judice correctly held that the acceptance must be com-
municated to the offeror and that the offeror could revoke the
offer provided the communication of such revocation is received
prior to the acceptance.2
That certainly reads like a decision on the merits.
The supreme court's reasoning in this "decision on the merits"
resulted from a judicial shelving of the expressed intent of the contract-
ing parties. Despite the parties' manifest intent to be bound by the terms
19. See Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So.2d 889, 893 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), citing 1 A.
CoRmIN, CONTRAcTs §§ 78, 80 (Supp. 1961).
20. 82 Fla. 351, 90 So. 158 (1921).
21. 136 U.S. 68 (1890).
22. Kendel v. Pontious, 244 So.2d 543, 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
23. The only pertinent portion of this "authority" alluded to by the appellate court
contained the statement: "But if an offer is accepted without conditions, and without vary-
ing its terms, and the acceptance is communicated to the other party without unreasonable
delay, a contract arises from which neither party can withdraw at pleasure." 33 FLA. JuR.
Vendors and Purchasers § 13 (1960). The encyclopedic text credits Tucker v. Gray, 82 Fla.
351, 90 So. 158 (1921), for this proposition, but as the text of this article indicates, Tucker
did not and does not support such a broad statement.
24. See Allen v. Florida Power Corp., 253 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1971).
25. Platt v. Mannheimer, 149 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
26. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., v. Bell, 116 So.2d 617, 619 (Fla. 1959), citing
Collier v. City of Homestead, 81 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1955).
27. 261 So.2d at 170 (emphasis added).
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of the contract as soon as both had signed it, the supreme court reasoned
that:
It was necessary that the sellers do more than indicate
their acceptance of the purchasers' offer by signing the deposit
receipt. They were required to set in motion some means by
which knowledge of that acceptance would come to the pur-
chasers before any enforceable contract could arise. An accep-
tance under these circumstances, which only remains in the
breast of the acceptor without being communicated to the
offeror, is no binding acceptance. 8
The reasoning quoted above reflects the general rule regarding the neces-
sity of a communication of the acceptance of an offer for a bilateral
contract.
However, the encyclopedic authorities cited by the supreme court
in support of this general rule also report an exception to the rule.
Williston states, at the end of the section quoted in the Kendel opinion,
that:
Where the offeror manifests his satisfaction with some
other mode of acceptance which the acceptor thereupon adopts,
the law imposes upon both parties the obligations which they
expect or by their course of conduct should have good reason
to expect.29
Corpus Juris Secundum specifies that:
It is sufficient if the offer is accepted in the mode expressly
or impliedly required by the offerer, . . . and if the offerer re-
quires or suggests a mode of acceptance which turns out, as far
as giving actual notice to the offerer, to be insufficient or entirely
nugatory, it is the fault of the offerer, and the agreement is
complete.80
And the last authority cited, the second edition of American Jurispru-
dence, also recognizes the exception to the general rule with the following
language:
If a reciprocal promise is required, . . . it is also essential, to
convert such proposal into a valid contract, that such acceptance
be communicated to the proposer or that some act be done by
the party accepting the proposal which the other party has
expressly or impliedly offered to treat as a communication.81
The supreme court's "decision on the merits" which ignores the
exception to the general rule and its failure to find conflict where con-
28. 261 So.2d at 169.
29. 1 S. WrLLISTON CoNTRcrs § 70 (3d ed. 1957).
30. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 45 (1955) (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
31. 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 43 (1964) (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
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flict exists, can do little to promote uniformity in the law. These short-
comings may, however, do much to lighten the supreme court's work
load by discouraging deserving litigants from seeking supreme court
review of conflicting decisions.
LARRY C. LINDER
THE EXPANSION OF STATE POWER THROUGH THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
Following public hearings which revealed numerous incidents of
sexual conduct between dancers and customers1 in bars licensed and
regulated by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
the Department promulgated regulations expressly prohibiting sexual live
entertainment and films in such bars and nightclubs. Plaintiffs, including
holders of various liquor licenses issued by the Department, and dancers
at premises operated by such licensees, unsuccessfully sought discretion-
ary review of the regulations in both the state court of appeals and in
the Supreme Court of California. The Department then joined with
plaintiff-petitioners in requesting the three-judge federal district court
to decide whether the regulations were invalid under the United States
Constitution. The district court held that the regulations unconstitu-
tionally abridged the freedoms guaranteed to petitioners by the first and
fourteenth amendments. 2 The United States Supreme Court held, reversed:
States have broad latitude under the twenty-first amendment to control
the manner and circumstances under which liquor in bars and nightclubs
may be dispensed. The Department's conclusion that both the sale of
liquor and lewd or naked entertainment should not take place simul-
taneously in licensed establishments was not irrational nor was the
prophylactic solution unreasonable. California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390
(1972).
The Court, while admitting that the regulation would prevent cer-
tain activities which would not be obscene under Roth v. United States,8
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, granted the state agency wide
latitude to suppress not only obscenity outside the scope of the first
amendment, but also speech which is clearly protected. 4 In justifying
1. The Court summarized the transcript of the hearings by stating:
Customers were found engaging in oral copulation with women entertainers;
customers engaged in public masturbation; and customers placed rolled currency
either directly into the vagina of a female entertainer, or on the bar in order that
she might pick it up herself.
California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 393 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as LaRue].
2. California v. LaRue, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) [hereinafter referred as Roth].
4. The obscenity test developed in Roth requires that the material must be taken as a
whole and when so viewed, must appeal to a prurient interest in sex, patently offend
1973 ]
